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OCTOBER TERM, 2002
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SALVADOR DOLLY v. NUGENERA, INC.*
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-00. Argued November 1, 2002-Decided May 1, 2003
WARDLAW, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Justices joined, except KOZINSKI, J., who filed a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
JUSTICE WARDLAW delivered the opinion of the Court:
We are asked to decide whether Respondent's patent on Petitioner's
entire genome and on select gene sequences is enforceable against him, and
whether he can be enjoined from selling samples of his own blood or tissue
on grounds that such use infringes Respondent's patent.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Salvador Dolly ("Dolly"), provided a blood sample to
Advanced Genetic Testing Company ("AGTC") on July 31, 1998, for
routine preconception genetic testing. Marilyn Hall Patel, Memorandum
and Order, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1073, 1074 (2002). Before providing his
sample, Dolly and representatives from AGTC signed a consent form
including a confidentiality provision limiting disclosure of Dolly's test
results to a designated physician or genetic counseling service. Id. The
consent form did not discuss disposal of Dolly's blood sample after testing
was completed. Id.
Respondent, NuGenEra, Inc., purchased a sample of Dolly's blood
from AGTC after the testing was completed. Patel, Memorandum and
Order at 1074. At that time, AGTC disclosed its confidentiality agreement
with Dolly and provided NuGenEra with a signed copy of the consent
form. Id. NuGenEra proceeded to conduct research on Dolly's blood cells
and found that they were completely resistant to human immunodeficiency
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virus (HIV). Id. In vitro and in vivo (transgenic mice) experiments
demonstrated that certain sequences of Dolly's genes (the "P" sequences)
conferred partial HIV resistance. Id. Based on these findings, NuGenEra
filed a patent application on Dolly's entire genome ("Dolly Genome") and
the P sequences, P1-PlO, genetic sequences thought to confer the HIV
resistance. See U.S. Patent No. F6,635,271 (issued to NuGenEra on May
28, 2000) ("the '271 patent").
The '271 patent contains three independent claims: Claim 1 comprises
the entire Dolly Genome; Claim 2 comprises the ten genetic sequences P1-
P10; and Claim 3 covers an immortalized human cell line containing the
Dolly Genome. See Patel, Memorandum and Order at 1075.
Because AGTC had not removed identifying information from
Dolly's blood sample prior to its sale, NuGenEra was able to learn that he
was the source of the HIV-resistant cells. Patel, Memorandum and Order
at 1075. NuGenEra notified Dolly of his natural HIV resistance. Id. Dolly
then formed a limited partnership, DollyDeal Limited, which sold samples
of Dolly's whole blood on November 30 and December 12, 2000 to
research scientists at the University of California and California State
University. Id. On January 28, 2001, DollyDeal offered to sell another
whole blood sample to Infants' Hospital. Id.
In response, NuGenEra sued Dolly in the United States District Court
for the Western District of California, alleging that Dolly's actions
infringed Claims 1 and 2 of the '271 patent. Patel, Memorandum and
Order at 1075. NuGenEra moved for summary judgment on November 9,
2001. See id. Dolly simultaneously filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment, asserting that the patent claims were invalid and that even if they
were valid, their enforcement violated his property and privacy rights. Id.
at 1074. Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel granted Petitioner's motion for
summary judgment as to Claim 1, finding that the entire Dolly Genome
lacked utility. Id. at 1073. The district court, however, denied summary
judgment as to Claim 2, upholding the patentability of the P sequences, and
granted partial summary judgment against Petitioner's affirmative
defenses. See id at 1093, 1096-1104.
The district court found that Claim 1 did not exhibit well-established
utility because the whole Dolly Genome's stated use, whole-genome
"restriction fragment length polymorphism" comparison analysis
("RFLP"), is not practical given the present state of technology. See Patel,
Memorandum and Order at 1081-83. Additionally, it found that this use
was not demonstrated in practice, meaning that Claim 1 lacked specific
utility. See id. at 1086. It further found that NuGenEra had patented
Dolly's whole genome before obtaining a proper understanding of where or
SAL VADOR DOLLY v. NUGENERA, INC.
how it confers HIV immunity. See id. The district court concluded that the
Dolly Genome should be available to the public for such research, and that
upholding such a broad patent claim would not be justified absent a
specific demonstrable benefit. See id. As for Claim 2, the district court
found that the P sequences exhibited specific and substantial utility, but not
well-established utility, by conferring HIV resistance in transgenic mice.
See id.
Turning to Dolly's affirmative defenses, the district court held that the
rights to privacy and bodily autonomy in the United States Constitution are
only enforceable against government actors. Patel, Memorandum and
Order at 1099. Reasoning that the only plausible state actor here, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), was not involved in
the unauthorized research on Dolly's blood, it concluded there was no state
action. Id. It also held that under California law there exist no property
rights in excised tissue. Id. at 1094. Although the court recognized Dolly's
strong policy arguments to the contrary, it concluded that the legislature
was the more appropriate body to address them. See id. at 1095-96.
A direct appeal was filed in this Court. See Genome Patent Has Day
in Court, THE PROGRAM FOR LAW & TECHNOLOGY AT CALIFORNIA
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL (Fall 2002),
available at http://www.techlaw.lls.edu/news/2002-newsletter.pdf. We
granted certiorari and now affirm.
II. ANALYSIS
A valid patent must meet the requirements of the Patent Act of 1952,
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). These requirements include a patentable subject
matter, novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Id. §§ 101-103. An issued
patent is presumed valid; a challenging party must present clear and
convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. Id. § 282; United
States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
First, an invention must comprise patentable subject matter, which the
statute defines as "any ... process, machine, manufacture ... composition
of matter, or... improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101. We have
identified laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas as
unpatentable "products of nature," as these are "manifestations of...
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see also Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112-21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham,
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55 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1853). However, a product of nature can be so
altered by human hands as to render it patentable subject matter: this
requires inventive work that essentially creates a new product that does not
exist in nature. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10
(1980).
Second, an invention must also be novel-creative and unanticipated
by prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 102. The patentee must be the first inventor of
the product. See id.
Third, an invention must be useful. Id. § 101. There are two ways for
an invention to meet the utility requirement: (1) well-established utility
(one skilled in the art of the invention will immediately recognize and
appreciate the utility asserted), or (2) specific, substantial, and credible
utility (particular to the subject matter claimed, capable of being defined in
a real-world or practical context, and the underlying logic appears
consistent with the facts on which it is based). See U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials 3,
5-7 (1999) ("PTO Guidelines"), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/utility/utilityguide.pdf (last visited
Sept. 9, 2003). Potential utility is generally not enough to warrant the grant
of a patent. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
Fourth, a patentable invention must be non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
That is, an invention must not only be new to the public domain, but
display ingenuity of such degree that its conception and reduction to
practice would not occur without a great amount of inventive effort. A
"flash of creative genius" is not required. See Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (citing Cuno Corp. v. Automatic
Devices Corp. 314 U.S. 84 (1941)). Rather, we determine non-obviousness
by examining several factors, including "the scope and content of the prior
art," the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue," and
"the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art." Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
Finally, some cases suggest that courts should not enforce an
otherwise valid patent if its enforcement violates constitutional rights or
contravenes public policy, or if it was procured on the basis of inequitable
conduct. See, e.g., Winbond Elecs. Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 262 F.3d
1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing inequitable conduct); Tol-O-Matic,
Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (discussing public policy), abrogated on other grounds by Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Lowell v.
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). But cf
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1999)
(construing the public policy exception narrowly).
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We review a lower court's grant or denial of summary judgment de
novo. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
465 n.10 (1992).
A. Claim 1-Patentability of the Entire Dolly Genome
We affirm the district court's ruling as to Claim 1. We agree with
Dolly that Claim 1, the entire Dolly Genome, lacks utility. NuGenEra
contends that Dolly's entire genome could be used as a diagnostic tool for
HIV resistance. However, such utility is neither well-established nor
specific, substantial, and credible. See PTO Guidelines, at 3-7. Presently
available genetic diagnostic techniques can only compare a small portion of
one genome with the corresponding portion of another genome to
determine whether they have an identical genetic sequence, making
NuGenEra's asserted use impractical under existing technology.
Furthermore, use of the entire genome in a diagnostic test would be
inordinately cumbersome and could not produce meaningful results due to
the natural genetic variation among humans. Thus, we agree with the
district court that Claim 1 is purely a "hunting license," and that
NuGenEra's claim is premature. See Marilyn Hall Patel, Memorandum and
Order, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1073, 1080 n.14 (2002); see also Brenner,
383 U.S. at 536. NuGenEra would have to conduct a great deal more
research before it could show a practical use for Claim 1. Additionally,
Claim 1 is not novel or non-obvious. The techniques used to isolate the
Dolly Genome are common; thus, prior art precludes patenting the entire
Dolly Genome on this basis. Although the particular genome at issue has
unique properties, only the genetic sequences that confer these properties
may be the proper subject of a patent claim. Because the human genome,
the sequence of which has been published by the Human Genome Project,
is 99.99% identical across the human species, NuGenEra expended neither
creativity nor inventive effort in sequencing the vast majority of Dolly's
genome. Thus, we conclude that Claim 1 is invalid.
B. Claim 2-Patentability of the P1-PlO Sequences
We also affirm the district court's ruling as to Claim 2. Claim 2 of
NuGenEra's patent covers the P1-PlO sequences of Dolly's genome.
NuGenEra isolated these sequences from the entire Dolly Genome and
determined that, when expressed in combination, they conferred the
majority of the observed HIV resistance. The observed HIV resistance was
reduced by the removal of any one of the P sequences.
2004]
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1. Novelty and Non-Obviousness
The P sequences of Claim 2 are novel because they never existed in
the public domain prior to NuGenEra's isolation of the genetic material.
They are also non-obvious because these variant gene sequences could not
have been predicted by the prior art. Moreover, the isolation of the P
sequences was non-obvious because NuGenEra was the only entity that
knew of Dolly's HIV resistance. Dolly's genome is the first known HIV-
resistant genome; the P1-P1O sequences that NuGenEra isolated are the
likely keys to this resistance. NuGenEra creatively searched through the
Dolly Genome to determine which of its sections conferred HIV resistance.
In doing so, NuGenEra used inventive effort and did not rely on prior art.
2. Utility
a. Well-Established Utility
Claim 2 does not possess well-established utility. NuGenEra argues
that the potential use of the P sequences in gene therapy would satisfy this
requirement. A well-established utility is one considered to be in common
use in the field by an average person skilled in the art. While gene therapy
may be widely discussed in the scientific literature, and its mechanism of
action widely understood by practitioners in the field, the technique is far
from commonly practiced. Indeed, the success of gene therapy has been
very limited until now. While some recent research has shown more
promise in this field, those results were not yet available at the time the
patent application was filed, which is the relevant time period for this
inquiry. Because we agree with the district court that gene therapy at that
time was far from well established, we affirm its finding that Claim 2 does
not possess well-established utility.
b. Specific, Substantial, and Credible Utility
Claim 2 satisfies the specific and substantial utility requirement.
NuGenEra has demonstrated partial HIV resistance in in vivo transgenic
mice studies. The PTO Guidelines allow for laboratory tests in standard
experimental animal models to demonstrate this type of utility. See In re
Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (holding that such animal
research results are "significant and useful"); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a drug demonstrating positive
results against experimental cancer cell lines in animals was specifically
useful).
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Dolly argues that Claim 2 lacks specific and substantial utility
because it fails to identify the distinct "sub-cellular factors," protein
products, or specific genes within the P sequences that actually impart HIV
resistance. He contends that in the absence of this information, any utility
possessed by Claim 2 is merely potential. We reject this argument: "[I]t is
not a requirement of patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or
even know, how or why the invention works .... " Newman v. Quigg, 877
F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol.
Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1911)); accord In re Storrs, 245
F.2d 474, 478 (C.C.P.A. 1957). The absence of an operative theory for the
P sequences does not, as Dolly contends, mean that the patent grants an
undue monopoly over an expansive scientific field. Rather, Claim 2
discloses a specific and limited combination of sequences proven to exhibit
a beneficial outcome according to accepted scientific methods.
Claim 2 also possesses sufficient credibility in its application and use.
The PTO Guidelines provide that a claim is credible if a person of ordinary
skill in the art would consider the asserted utility to be credible in view of
the disclosure and other evidence in the record. See PTO Guidelines, at 5.
NuGenEra asserts two credible applications for Claim 2: (1) a diagnostic
tool for determining whether another genetic sequence contains the P
sequence and its HIV-resistant properties, and (2) an actual combination of
DNA sequences, as was used in NuGenEra's transgenic mice studies and
was found to be responsible for the resulting partial HIV resistance.
We find both proffered uses to be credible. As to the P sequences' use
as a diagnostic tool, Dolly argues that there are insufficient facts to show
that the P sequences of Claim 2 are the definite source of the exhibited HIV
resistance. He also maintains that even if they were, such use would be too
laborious and costly to be credible. We conclude that the use of the P
sequences for diagnosis was a recognized technique in the art at the time of
patent application. We do not consider cost in determining whether a
proffered use is credible. As the district court correctly noted, "while the
value of the Claim 2 sequences may presently be useful only to establish
absence or presence of HIV resistance in a manner similar to [Dolly's], this
remains a credible application ... therapeutically useful to the medical care
system." Patel, Memorandum and Order at 1087-88. We therefore affirm
the district court's finding that Claim 2 has specific, substantial, and
credible utility.
The utility of a patent claim can rest either on a finding of specific,
substantial, and credible utility, or on a finding of well-established utility.
Although Claim 2 does not satisfy the standard of well-established utility, it
is patentable on the basis of its specific, substantial, and credible utility.
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Because we find that Claim 2 of the '271 patent meets the statutory
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, patentable subject matter and
utility, we affirm the district court's holding.
C. Public Policy Challenges
1. Privacy Rights
We need not consider whether Dolly's constitutional right to "genetic
privacy" was violated, or even opine on whether such a right exists,
although at least one court of appeals has recognized such a right in certain
circumstances. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135
F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) ("One can think of few subject areas more
personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one's
health or genetic make-up.") Even if such a constitutional right exists, it
could be violated only by state action, which is not present. The only
governmental entity that had any involvement here is the PTO, which
approved NuGenEra's patent. Dolly does not allege, however, that the
PTO's actions violated his constitutional rights. Although we have
recognized that in certain instances government entities that play indirect
roles in producing an unconstitutional outcome are sufficiently entwined to
satisfy the state action requirement, we decline to extend Shelley's
reasoning to this case. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948)
(holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants on
real estate).
2. Right to Bodily Integrity
We also reject Dolly's assertion that enforcement of NuGenEra's
patent violates his constitutional right to bodily integrity. We have never
recognized as broad a right as the one Dolly asserts; specifically, no cases
have recognized any such rights that extend beyond the corporeal body.
Cf Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment flows from decisions involving the State's invasions into the
body."). We decline Dolly's suggestion to do so here. Moreover, any
violation would also require state action, which is absent in this case.
3. Property Rights
Nor do we see any violation of Dolly's property rights sufficient to
invalidate Claim 2. Property rights are created and defined by state law,
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and thus we look to California law to determine what property rights, if
any, Dolly has in his blood and the genetic information contained therein.
See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In
California, a person retains no property rights in excised tissue. See Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-88 (Cal. 1990). There is
no reason to limit the holding of Moore to cases where the excised tissue or
sample is not identifiable or genetically unique. Thus, we conclude that
enforcement of the '271 patent is not barred by any property right.
4. Consent
Consent vel non is not a relevant consideration. Although Dolly
contends that NuGenEra should not be allowed to enforce its patent
because it obtained Dolly's blood in violation of the consent agreement
between Dolly and AGTC, NuGenEra is not a party to that agreement, and,
thus, is not bound by it. We express no opinion on the merits of a breach of
contract claim by Dolly against AGTC.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
It is so ordered
WARDLAW, J.
CHIN, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE KozINSKI, concurring as to Claim 1 and dissenting as
to Claim 2:
I agree with the majority that Claim 1 is invalid. I dissent, however,
as to Claim 2. NuGenEra's invention, "[a] combination of isolated nucleic
acid sequences.., comprising [sequences] P1-P10," is a product of nature
that falls outside the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Marilyn Hall Patel, Memorandum and Order, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1073, 1075 n.5 (2002) (quoting U.S. Patent No. F6,635,271 (issued May
28, 2000) at 971).
It is elementary that "phenomena of nature" are "free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). A biologist who finds a new species of bacteria
in a pond may have made an important discovery, but he cannot seek
refuge in the patent laws. See id. This is so, even if he used ingenious
methods to track down the organism and even if his activity is one we prize
as highly socially useful. However industrious he was, Congress has not
afforded protection. Patents are for inventors, not finders.
Courts have finessed this principle somewhat by holding that a
purified version of a naturally occurring substance is actually a new
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substance altogether. See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401-02
(C.C.P.A. 1970). This theory is debatable; the chemical compound itself is
naturally occurring, even if it is typically found adulterated. But, taking
these cases as settled law, I cannot see how NuGenEra created anything
merely by isolating a particular set of gene sequences. One who isolates
something does not change its nature; he merely plucks it from its
context-like the biologist who fishes bacteria out of a pond. A gene
sequence is a gene sequence, whether isolated or embedded in some larger
structure.
The intractable problem for NuGenEra is that, however much work it
put into locating the P sequences, all it ever did was find them, It did not
create anything that was not already there; indeed, the genes were already
performing the very function that makes them valuable. NuGenEra did not
patent the process it used to isolate the sequences; it did not patent some
useful application for them; it did not patent some serum it created from
them. Rather, it sought to patent the gene sequences themselves, and that,
it seems to me, it may not do.
We do not know who "invented" Dolly's genes-a question doubtless
better left to theologians. But it wasn't NuGenEra, and that resolves the
case.
